Arming the Warlords: The Unanswered Questions Behind PNG’s Growing Insurgency Risk


 

The growing militarisation of tribal conflicts in Papua New Guinea’s upper Highlands is no longer a law and order issue—it is a looming national security crisis. For over a decade, successive governments have observed, often passively, as communities with no formal incomes amass military-grade weaponry. These developments demand urgent scrutiny, not only from within Papua New Guinea, but from our regional partners invested in peace and stability across the Pacific.

The troubling question remains: Who is arming these warlords?

In a country where private gun ownership has been effectively outlawed for over 30 years, the presence of weapons such as AR-15s and SLRs—costing upwards of K75,000 each on the black market—is both shocking and inexplicable. Ammunition alone, reportedly fetching K100 per bullet, points to a well-financed, highly organised supply chain. These are not makeshift arms but tactical assets that suggest training, discipline, and purpose.

What makes this situation more complex is the economic context. The provinces most affected—Hela, Enga, and parts of Southern Highlands—also happen to be among the most well-resourced in Papua New Guinea, with annual government budgets exceeding K600 million each. Add to that PIP allocations and discretionary development grants, and billions of Kina are cycled through these provincial economies every year.

The uncomfortable question that follows is whether public funds are being used, directly or indirectly, to fund illegal militias.

Are state contracts, infrastructure payments, or development project funds being siphoned off to finance armed groups? Is corruption feeding insurgency? If yes, then the state may inadvertently be funding its own instability.

This is not just a localised issue. The proliferation of advanced weaponry among non-state actors poses a clear and present danger to national sovereignty. There is no guarantee that these armed groups will confine their violence within their own provinces. As history has shown in other fragile states, well-armed factions often expand their reach, disrupt regional governance, and challenge the state’s monopoly on force.

Another layer of concern is the potential leakage of arms and ammunition from the Papua New Guinea Defence Force and Police. These are the only institutions legally authorised to import military-grade weapons. Do these agencies have robust inventory control systems? Are there transparent audits and public reports on munitions stockpiles and distribution? Without public accountability, the possibility of state-linked diversion cannot be ruled out.

The emergence of what can only be described as illegal private armies should ring alarm bells across Waigani and Canberra alike. Papua New Guinea’s security sector reform has been long overdue, and this arms build-up only highlights the urgency.

Beyond policing and enforcement, a comprehensive response will require:

  • A forensic audit of public funds flowing into conflict-prone provinces.

  • A parliamentary inquiry into the source and flow of illegal weapons.

  • A revitalised civilian disarmament strategy, backed by credible incentives and community peacebuilding.

  • International cooperation, especially with Australia and New Zealand, on arms tracking, surveillance, and cross-border interdiction.

Ultimately, this is a test of state authority. If the state cannot—or will not—confront this emerging threat, then we are on a trajectory toward internal collapse. The erosion of national unity, the weakening of democratic institutions, and the normalisation of violence are not abstract risks—they are already unfolding.

PNG must act, and act now.

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